Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination
Mathias Staudigl and
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation whereagents may decide on an action in a 2 x 2- coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their linking choice. The main reason behind this result is that constrained interactions create a tradeoff between the interactions an agent has and those he would rather have. Further, we discuss convex linking costs and provide suffcient conditions for the payoff dominant convention to be selected in mxm coordination games.
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Constrained interactions and social coordination (2014)
Working Paper: Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination (2014)
Working Paper: Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination (2013)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:1004
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