EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Imitation and the Role of Information in Overcoming Coordination Failures

Carlos Alós-Ferrer () and Simon Weidenholzer

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: We model the structure of a firm or an organization as a network and consider minimum-effort games played on this network as a metaphor for cooperations failing due to coordination failures. For a family of behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. However, in the presence of informational spillovers, a minimal condition on the network guarantees that efficient conventions will eventually dominate. An analogous result is established for average opinion games.

JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
Date: 2010-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:1008

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Series data maintained by Paper Administrator ().

 
Page updated 2017-09-22
Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:1008