Immigration and voting on the size and the composition of public spending
Karin Mayr ()
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
This paper develops a model to analyze the effects of immigration by skill on the outcome of a majority vote among natives on both the size as well as the composition of public spending. Public spending can be of two types, spending on rival goods (transfers) and on non-rival goods (public goods). I find that relative preferences for the different types of public spending are crucial for the effects of immigration. In particular, immigrants of either skill can increase (decrease) the size of total public spending, if natives have a relative preference for spendingon public goods (spending on transfers). I provide some illustration of potential relative spending preferences in OECD countries using panel data for 1980 - 2010.
JEL-codes: F2 H4 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mig, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Immigration and Voting on the Size and the Composition of Public Spending (2013)
Working Paper: Immigration and voting on the size and the composition of public spending (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:1101
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Series data maintained by Paper Administrator ().