Non-cooperative resource exploitation by patient players
Gerhard Sorger () and
Tapan Mitra ()
Additional contact information
Tapan Mitra: http://www.univie.ac.at/Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
We consider a discrete-time dynamic game in which a nite number of players extract a non-renewable resource and derive consumption solely from the extracted amount (cake-eating game). Markov-perfect Nash equilibria can be constructed in this game not only if the players have time-preference factors that are smaller than 1, but also if these factors are equal to or even larger than 1. We demonstrate this result both for the case of identical players and for the case of heterogeneous players. In addition we study the in uence of the model parameters on the equilibrium.
JEL-codes: C73 Q30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Noncooperative Resource Exploitation by Patient Players (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:1408
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Series data maintained by Paper Administrator ().