Stability in Network Formation Games with Streams of Payoffs: An Experimental Study
Mariya Teteryatnikova () and
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Mariya Teteryatnikova: http://www.univie.ac.at/Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
We run a novel network formation experiment with a stream of payo s and relatively unstructured link formation process, and test the performance of a number of theoretical stability concepts in this environment. We focus especially on the issue of myopic versus farsighted behaviour in network formation. A subtle treatment variation demonstrates clearly the power of myopic stability concepts in identifying the most stable networks. However, we also nd support for farsighted concepts of stability, especially those that assume players are pessimistic about the eventual outcome of a deviation.
JEL-codes: A14 C71 C92 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-ore
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:1508
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