Learning and equilibrium selection in a coordination game with heterogeneous agents

Alberto Fogale, Paolo Pellizzari () and Massimo Warglien ()

No 135, Working Papers from Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice

Abstract: We study a modified version of the coordination game presented in [van Huyck et al., 1994], where a representative selection dynamics was proposed to explain experimental data. Assuming that the agents adjust their moves in the direction of the best response, we derive a formal analysis of the stability of the equilibria. We show by simulation that the interior equilibrium is robustly reached even when considerable heterogeneity is allowed among the agents. Our truly multi-agent game is capable of approximating quite well both the median game convergence and the experimental data.

Keywords: Coordination game; Equilibrium selection; Best reply dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D83 C63 C15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-gth
Date: 2006-05
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.dma.unive.it/wpdma/2006wp135.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vnm:wpaper:135

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Giovanni Fasano ().