Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committees

Catherine C Eckel () and Charles A. Holt ()

Working Papers from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics

Keywords: economic theory; voting; behaviour; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1988
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