Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committees
Catherine C Eckel () and
Charles A. Holt ()
Working Papers from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics
Keywords: economic theory; voting; behaviour; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vpi:wpaper:889
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