Incomplete enforcement of pollution regulation: bargaining power of Chinese factories

Hua Wang (), Nlandu Mamingi, Benoit Laplante and Susmita Dasgupta ()

No 2756, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Only a small number of studies have empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and enforcement performed by environmental regulators, and most of these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast, the authors empirically examine the determinants of enforcement in China. More precisely, they analyze the determinants of firms'relative bargaining power with local environmental authorities with respect to the enforcement of pollution charges. The authors show that private sector firms appear to have less bargaining power than state-owned enterprises. Contrary to earlier findings, they also show that firms facing adverse financial situations have more bargaining power than other firms and are more likely to pay smaller pollution charges than they should be paying. Finally, the authors show that the greater the social impact of a firm's emissions (as measured by complaints), the less bargaining power it has with local environmental authorities.

Keywords: Water and Industry; Sanitation and Sewerage; Environmental Economics&Policies; Public Health Promotion; Water Conservation; Water and Industry; Environmental Economics&Policies; Health Monitoring&Evaluation; TF030632-DANISH CTF - FY05 (DAC PART COUNTRIES GNP PER CAPITA BELOW USD 2; 500/AL; Sanitation and Sewerage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-01-31
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Related works:
Journal Article: Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories (2003)
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