Trading market access for competition policy enforcement

Bernard Hoekman () and Kamal Saggi ()

No 3188, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Motivated by discussions at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on multilateral disciplines with respect to competition law, the authors develop a two-country model that explores the incentives of a developing country to offer increased market access (by way of a tariff reduction) in exchange for a ban on foreign export cartels by its developed country trading partner. They show that such a bargain is feasible and can generate a globally welfare-maximizing outcome. The authors also explore the incentives for bilateral cooperation when the developing country uses transfers to"pay"for competition enforcement by the developed country. A comparison of the two cases shows that there exist circumstances in which the stick (the tariff) is more effective in sustaining bilateral cooperation than the carrot (the transfer). Furthermore, the scope for cooperation is maximized when both instruments are used. An implication of the analysis is that developing countries have incentives to support an explicit WTO prohibition of export cartels.

Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Markets and Market Access; Labor Policies; Economic Theory&Research; ICT Policy and Strategies; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; Access to Markets; Markets and Market Access (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
Date: 2004-01-15
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentSer ... DF/325550wps3188.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3188

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank
Address: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Roula I. Yazigi ().