Market access for sale: Latin America's lobbying for U.S. tariff preferences

Hiau Looi Kee (), Marcelo Olarreaga () and Peri Agostinho da Silva ()

No 3198, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters.

Keywords: National Governance; Export Competitiveness; Environmental Economics&Policies; Rules of Origin; Economic Theory&Research; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; National Governance; Export Competitiveness; Environmental Economics&Policies; Poverty and Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01-01
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Working Paper: Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for US Tariff Preferences (2003)
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