Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy

Filipe Campante () and Francisco H. G. Ferreira ()

No 3240, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The authors investigate the theoretical effects of lobbying and pressure group activities on both economic efficiency and on equity. Looking at lobbying as a political activity that takes place alongside production, they find that lobbies may generate economic inefficiency as part of the process of shifting the allocation of government expenditures in their favor. Outcomes of this non-electoral political process will always be biased toward the group with a comparative advantage in politics, rather than in production. In a context where the main political conflict is one between"the rich"and"the poor,"political equilibria may be either populist (inefficiently pro-poor) or oligarchic (inefficiently pro-rich), depending on each group's lobbying effectiveness.

Keywords: Labor Policies; Environmental Economics&Policies; National Governance; Economic Theory&Research; Fiscal&Monetary Policy; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; National Governance; ICT Policy and Strategies; Knowledge Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: 2004-03-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy (2004)
Journal Article: Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy (2007)
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