Enforcement of labor regulation, informal labor, and firm performance

Rita Almeida () and Pedro Carneiro ()

No 3756, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper investigates how enforcement of labor regulation affects the firm's use of informal employment and its impact on firm performance. Using firm level data on informal employment and firm performance, and administrative data on enforcement of regulation at the city level, the authors show that in areas where law enforcement is stricter firms employ a smaller amount of informal employment. Furthermore, by reducing the firm's access to unregulated labor, stricter enforcement also decreases average wages, productivity, and investment. The results are robust to several specification changes, and to instrumenting enforcement with (1) measures of access of labor inspectors to firms, and (2) measures of general law enforcement in the area where the firm is located.

Keywords: Labor Markets; Work&Working Conditions; Labor Standards; Municipal Financial Management; Labor Management and Relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
Date: Written
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentSer ... ered/PDF/wps3756.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3756

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank
Address: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Roula I. Yazigi ().