Lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the United States

Kishore Gawande and Bernard Hoekman ()

No 3819, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. The authors test the model using a detailed cross-sectional data set of agricultural protection, subsidies, and political action committee (PAC) contributions in the late 1990s. The model is qualitatively affirmed by the data. They make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model's quantitative implications, also found in recent studies. This solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government. The results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge.

Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; Free Trade; Consumption; Markets and Market Access; Technology Industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States (2006)
Journal Article: Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States (2006)
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