Litigation and settlement: new evidence from labor courts in Mexico

David Scott Kaplan (), Joyce Sadka and Silva-Mendez, Jorge Luis

No 4434, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress; Arbitration; Information Security&Privacy; Labor Markets; Judicial System Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-lab and nep-law
Date: 2007-12-01

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Working Paper: Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4434

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