Banking Fragility and Disclosure: International Evidence

Solomon A. Tadesse ()

No wp748, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School

Abstract: Motivated by recent public policy debates on the role of market discipline in banking stability, I examine the impact of greater bank disclosure in mitigating the likelihood of systemic banking crisis. In a cross sectional study of banking systems across 49 countries in the 90s, I find that banking crises are less likely in countries with financial reporting regimes characterized by (i) comprehensive disclosure (ii) informative disclosure, (iii) timely disclosure and (iv) more stringent auditing.

Keywords: Banking Crisis; Disclosure; Transparency; Audit Stringency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-bec, nep-cwa, nep-fin and nep-sea
Date: Written
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-748

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