Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives
Gleb Lanine and
No wp778, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan
We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that violate the individuals’ deposits to capital ratio, because this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability.
Keywords: Bank supervision; bank crisis; Russia. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 N2 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-fin, nep-fmk, nep-mac, nep-reg and nep-tra
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Working Paper: Bank supervision Russian style: Rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-778
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