Banking Fragility & Disclosure: International Evidence

Solomon A. Tadesse ()

No wp874, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School

Abstract: Motivated by recent public policy debates on the role of market discipline in banking stability, the study examines the impact of greater bank disclosure in mitigating the likelihood of systemic banking crisis. In a cross sectional study of banking systems across forty-nine countries in the nineties, it finds evidence that banking crises are less likely in countries with regulatory regimes that require extensive bank disclosure and stringent auditing.

Keywords: Banking Crisis; Disclosure; Audit Stringency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09-01

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wdi:papers:2007-874

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