Learning to Play Nash from the Best

Robert Gazzale ()

No 2009-03, Department of Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics, Williams College

Abstract: I experimentally investigate the effects of the ability to imitate successful others on convergence to the one-shot Nash equilibrium. I study a two-player game (Potters and Suetens Forthcoming) in which a single parameter determines the existence of strategic complementarities. I generally confirm previous findings when learning from others is not possible: games with strategic complementarities converge more robustly to the Nash equilibrium than those without. However, I find the reverse with the ability to learn from successful others as this information significantly improves convergence in games without strategic complementarities but has no effect and possibly a negative effect on games with complementarities.

JEL-codes: C90 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2009-06
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