Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliance Networks
Yuntong Wang ()
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Yuntong Wang: Department of Economics, University of Windsor
No 1605, Working Papers from University of Windsor, Department of Economics
This paper takes an axiomatic approach to the revenue sharing problem for an airline alliance network. We propose a simple sharing rule that allocates the revenue of each ?ight equally among the carriers of the ?ight. We show that it is the only rule satisfying the axioms of Separability, the Null Airline Property, and Equal Treatment of Equals. We show that the rule coincides with the Shapley value of the game associated with the problem. We provide two extensions of the rule, allowing it to depend on the lengths or the capacities of the ?ight legs. We also consider the maximum revenue problem for the airline alliance. We propose a simple Integer Linear Programming model. We examine its Owen set. Lastly, we provide an algorithm to compute both the optimal solution and the revenue sharing solution given by the simple sharing rule for the maximum revenue problem.
Keywords: Revenue sharing; Airline alliance; Network. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net and nep-tre
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http://web2.uwindsor.ca/economics/RePEc/wis/pdf/1605.pdf First version, 2016 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wis:wpaper:1605
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