Economic Performance and Leadership Accountability: An Econometric Analysis

M.E. Gallego

Working Papers from Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Logit models of leadership duration test whether different agents are responsible for constitutional and unconstitutional transfers of power. Lagged values of per capita real investment have a significantly negative impact on unconstitutional transitions. This suggests that the elites of less developed countries determine the timing of unconstitutional transfers as they are the ones with investment capabilities. Lagged values of per capita real consumption are associated with the well-being of an average citizen. However, consumption exerts an unexpected positive influence on constitutional transitions when political regime differences are not taken into account. This significant effect disappears with the inclusion of parliamentary and presidential regime dummies.

Keywords: ECONOMIC MODELS; REGRESSION ANALYSIS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 C35 C14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wlu:wpaper:97-7

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Shelagh Pepper ().