The Art of Compromise

William David Scoones

Working Papers from Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Policy is modeled as the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash’s (1950) bargaining framework, modified to account for a simultaneous legislative ratification vote. Though agreements favor the legislative representative least willing to compromise, agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties’ ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge.

Keywords: Vote balancing; intergovernmental bargaining; legislative ratification; willingness to compromise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 C72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005, Revised 2005
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wlu:wpaper:eg0042

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