Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration
Tito Cordella () and
No 97/13, Working Papers from Arizona State University, Department of Economics
In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., moving towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., moving away from the Walrasian amount).
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration (2002)
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras equilibrium: An illustration (1995)
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration (1994)
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration (1994)
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:astewp:9713
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