Hard Cores and Soft Cores: Evolving Coalitions, Edgeworth and the Bolzmann Machine&

Arthur DeVany
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Arthur DeVany: Department of Economics and Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, UCI.

Working Papers from University of California at Los Angeles, Center for Computable Economics

Abstract: This is a study of emergent economic order---order that is the result of human action but not human design. I study a coordination game in which locally connected agents act without deliberation. Their locally optimal actions propagate through neighbors to others, and coalitions form adaptively. I map the game onto a hypercube and develop a connectionist model of it. Simulation results show that the process is self-organizing and evolves to optimal or near-optimal equilibria; the agent network computes the core of the game. Its equilibria are path-dependent and the dynamic may become trapped on local optima; broken symmetry and noise promote evolution to global optima. Primary field (17), self-organization and emergent behavior;

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