Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy

Gerald Roger Marschke ()

Discussion Papers from State University of New York at Albany, Department of Economics

JEL-codes: J41 J33 D73 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy (2000)
Working Paper: Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy
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