The CO2 Abatement Game: Costs, Incentives and the Stability of a Sub-Global Coalition

Mustafa Babiker
Additional contact information
Mustafa Babiker: University of Colorado at Boulder

Computational Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper studies the economic incentives and the institutional issues governing the outcomes of a short-term climate change policy package guided by the United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Berlin Mandate initiatives. Game theoretic tools and the global trade-environment interface are explored within a 26-region, 13- commodity computable general equilibrium framework to characterize the incentives of OECD regions to comply with a non-binding agreement in a carbon abatement coalition. The results have shown that the achievement of such a coalition as well as its expansion by means of self-financed schemes are possible if suitable trade instruments are designed.

Keywords: CGE; Abatement; CO2; coalition; subgame; connected-game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Date: 1998-07-26
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/UNIX Sparc TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 55 ; figures: included. This work has one the Society of Computational Economics' contest for graduate student paper 1998
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/comp/papers/9807/9807002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpco:9807002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Computational Economics from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().