Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

Pranab K. Bardhan and Nirvikar Singh ()

Development and Comp Systems from EconWPA

Abstract: In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

JEL-codes: C72 D30 D70 O10 P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: Written 2004-07-02
Note: 33 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/dev/papers/0407/0407003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (2004)
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