Marriage and Assortative Matching in Rural Ethiopia

Marcel Fafchamps () and Agnes Quisumbing
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Agnes Quisumbing: International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C.

Development and Comp Systems from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of human and physical capital at marriage. Using detailed data from rural Ethiopia, we Þnd ample evidence of assortative matching at marriage. Assets brought to marriage are distributed in a highly unequal manner. Sorting operates at a variety of levels - wealth, schooling, and work experience - that cannot be summarized into a single additive index. For first unions, assets brought to marriage are positively associated with parents' wealth, indicating that a bequest motive affects assets at marriage. Unlike most brides, grooms appear to accumulate individual assets over time and over marriages. The marriage market is a major conduit for rural and gender inequality.

JEL-codes: O P (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
Date: 2004-09-22
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 39
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