Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

Ryo Horii () and Tatsuro Iwaisako
Additional contact information
Tatsuro Iwaisako: Ritsumeikan University

Development and Comp Systems from EconWPA

Abstract: The growth effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection are examined in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. Stronger IPR protection, which reduces the probability of imitation, raises the reward for innovation. However, stronger protection reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which it is easier to innovate than in monopolistic sectors, thus concentrating researchers into fewer competitive sectors. As R&D projects take time until they are completed, concentration of R&D activity in a field raises the possibility of duplication of innovation, thereby hindering growth. In several settings, we show that imperfect, rather than perfect, protection maximizes growth.

Keywords: intellectual property rights; endogenous growth; quality ladder; imitation; leapfrogging; duplication. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O34 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08-03
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 37
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/dev/papers/0508/0508001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (2005)
Working Paper: Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (2006)
Journal Article: Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Development and Comp Systems from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().