Cost sharing and catch sharing

Þórólfur Matthíasson ()

Development and Comp Systems from EconWPA

Abstract: The model developed in this paper attempts to provide an explanation of the fact that Icelandic vessel owners and Icelandic skippers do not share costs of operation of a vessel. In the model a skipper is contracted to take a fishing vessel to the fishing ground. The skipper is remunerated with a share of the catch, subject to an agreed minimum. Skippers and vessel owners are modelled as if risk neutral. Skippers develop a fishing strategy which is more costly, the higher the value of the potential catch associated with that strategy. Costs that accrue are partly pecuniary (and shareable) and partly skipper-specific (and non- shareable). The conclusions of the paper demonstrate that given the assumptions of our model, a vessel owner should prefer a remuneration contract with a positive revenue share and zero cost share.

Keywords: Cost sharing; remuneration systems; fishing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D33 J33 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-mic
Date: 1996-12-13
Note: Type of Document - WordPerfect 3.5 for the Mac; prepared on Macintosh; to print on PostScript; pages: 34; figures: none
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/dev/papers/9612/9612002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cost sharing and catch sharing (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:9612002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Development and Comp Systems from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().