Abstract:
The case of a French merger can be used to better understand the nature of conflicts of interest and cognitive conflicts between accountants, shareholders, lawyers and judges. This is especially the case when exchange ratios are unfairly established. When caught in a situation of asymmetrical information, minority shareholders try to obtain more information about the auditors' report through a trial. The financial knowledge possessed by the judge then becomes a necessary condition if shareholders are to be protected.
Keywords:Auditor; minority shareholder; merger; trial; exchange ratio; fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:N (search for similar items in EconPapers) New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc Date: 2005-03-24 Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 24. in « L’entreprise, le chiffre et le droit », éditeurs J.G. Degos et S. Trébucq, Bordeaux (2005), pp. 385-407. View list of references