Time preferences: do they matter in bargaining?

Paola Manzini ()

Experimental from EconWPA

Abstract: Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences are first elicited in a preliminary phase, and then bargaining begins. I show that although subjects are sensitive to the timing of a monetary reward, this plays no role in determining bargaining behaviour. To the contrary, when the bargaining game is played in conventional experimental setting with monetary cost of delay, these do have an impact on subjects? conduct in negotiations.

Keywords: Bargaining; time preferences; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2001-06-22
Note: Type of Document - .pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; pages: 37; figures: included. Instructions available upon request
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Working Paper: Time Preferences: Do They Matter in Bargaining? (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0106001

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