Batch Queues with Choice of Arrivals: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Study

William E. Stein, Amnon Rapoport, Darryl A. Seale, Hongtao Zhang and Rami Zwick ()
Additional contact information
William E. Stein: Texas A&M University
Amnon Rapoport: University of Arizona & Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Darryl A. Seale: University of Nevada Las Vegas
Hongtao Zhang: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology

Experimental from EconWPA

Abstract: We study both theoretically and experimentally the decisions players make in two queueing games with batch service. In both games, players are asked to independently decide when to join a discrete-time queue to receive service, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. Equilibrium solutions in pure and mixed strategies are constructed for two games where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed. They are then tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information) in a 2X2 between-subject design. With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play.

Keywords: Batch queueing; equilibrium solution; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11-09
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 45
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/exp/papers/0411/0411001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study (2007)
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