The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest
Ralph-C Bayer () and
Matthias Sutter ()
Experimental from EconWPA
We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities investing costly effort in the concealment and detection of tax evasion. We show that these socially inefficient efforts - as well as the frequency of tax evasion - depend positively on the prevailing tax rate, but not on the fine which is imposed in the event of detected tax evasion. Tax evasion is less frequent, though, than a model with risk neutral taxpayers predicts. We find evidence that this is due to individual moral constraints rather than to risk aversion.
Keywords: tax evasion; contest; experiment; tax rates; fines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 K42 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp, nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Journal Article: The excess burden of tax evasion--An experimental detection-concealment contest (2009)
Working Paper: The Excess Burden of Tax Evasion: An Experimental Detection-Concealment Contest (2004)
Working Paper: The Excess Burden of Tax Evasion: An Experimental Detection-Concealment Contest (2003)
Working Paper: The excess burden of tax evasion – An experimental detection-concealment contest (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0412003
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