Within-Team Competition in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game
Tibor Neugebauer and
Javier Perote ()
Experimental from EconWPA
We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects to polarize both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.
Keywords: Coordination Games; Team Incentives; Minimum Effort Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 28
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Journal Article: WITHIN-TEAM COMPETITION IN THE MINIMUM EFFORT COORDINATION GAME (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0503006
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