Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
Javier Perote (),
Ulrich Schmidt and
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Malte Loos: University Kiel
Experimental from EconWPA
The recent literature suggests that people have social preferences with a self-serving bias. Our data analysis reveals that the stylized fact of declining cooperation in repeated public goods experiments results from this bias and adaptation.
Keywords: experimental economics; information feedback; public goods; voluntary contributions; conditional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 13
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Journal Article: Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2009)
Working Paper: Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0503009
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