The quality of the signal matters - A note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves

Wieland Müller

Experimental from EconWPA

Abstract: In a recent study Huck and Müller (1998) report that--in contrast to Bagwell's (1995) prediction--first movers in a simple experimental market do not lose their commitment power in the presence of noise. The present note shows that it is the quality of the signal and not the knowledge about the physical timing of moves that is responsible for these experimental results. Additionally, the findings reported here provide further evidence that the positional order protocol cannot induce non--equilibrium play.

Keywords: commitment; first-mover advantage; imperfect observability; positional order protocol; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02-12
Note: Type of Document - PS; prepared on IBM PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 10 ; figures: included

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Working Paper: The quality of the signal matters - A note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves
Journal Article: The quality of the signal matters -- a note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:9902001

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