Privileged Interfirm/Bank Relationships in Central Europe: Trigger or Trap for Corporate Governance?

Gerhard Fink, Peter R. Haiss, Lucjan T. Orlowski () and Dominick Salvatore
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Gerhard Fink: Vienna University of Business & Economics
Peter R. Haiss: Bank Austria
Dominick Salvatore: Fordham University

Finance from EconWPA

Abstract: The paper focuses on the question whether banks and capital markets in Central Europe are capable of exerting a positive influence on enterprise performance at the present stage of the economic transformation. These markets are characterised by privileged, collaborative interfirm/interbank relationships demonstrated through various channels. Among them is the competition for private deposits between commercial and national banks that are simultaneously supervisors of commercial banks, as is the case in Poland. Other channels include: heavily indebted large banks that are owners of industrial companies (as is the case in Slovakia with the steel mill VSZ owning the third largest bank IRB), investment funds that are facilitating industrial restructuring, and foreign banks holding only minority stakes in large domestic financial institutions.

JEL-codes: G20 P30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
Date: 2005-02-12
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 32
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0502012

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