Cooperation and Punishment

Jonathan Thomas () and Robert Andrew Evans

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a draconian strategy whose presence in the perturbations guarantees that any equilibrium is efficient. We also argue that the results of Anderlini and Sabourian (1995) using perturbation strategies which are cooperative (and hence non-draconian) are not due to computability per se but to the further restrictions they impose on allowable beliefs.

Keywords: common interests; repeated games; cooperation; computability; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-06-13
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; pages: 22 ; figures: included. pdf file, prepared from sci word
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0004/0004002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation and Punishment (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().