Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information

Jonathan Thomas () and Martin William Cripps

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially the same as that in the undiscounted case. This implies that even small amounts of incomplete information can lead to a discontinuous change in the equilibrium payoff set. For the case of equal discount factors, however, and under an assumption that strictly individually rational payoffs exist, a result akin to the Folk Theorem holds when a complete information game is perturbed by a small amount of incomplete information.

Keywords: reputation; Folk Theorem; repeated games; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-06-14
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; pages: 45 ; figures: included. pdf file, prepared from sci word
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0004/0004003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().