Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-09
Note: PDF format

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0004/0004006.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities (2000)
Journal Article: Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().