The Core of a Partition Function Game

László Á. Kóczy ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We consider partition function games and introduce new defini-tions of the core that include the effects of externalities. We assume that all players behave rationally and that all stable outcomes arising are consistent with the appropriate generalised concept of the core. The result is a recursive definition of the core where residual subgames are considered as games with fewer players and with a partition function that captures the externalities of the deviating coalition. Some properties of the new concepts are discussed.

Keywords: core; partition function; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-02-07
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on A4; pages: 9; figures: none. A PDF file of 9 pages.
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Core of a Partition Function Game (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0012004

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