Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes

Itzhak Gilboa (), Dov Samet and David Schmeidler ()
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Dov Samet: Tel Aviv university

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Abstract: Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society's utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.

Keywords: Utilitarianism; Pareto (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05-20
Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 10
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Related works:
Working Paper: Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes (2001)
Journal Article: Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0105001

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