The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible

László Á. Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: For each outcome (i.e.~a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we label outsider independent - is employed.

Keywords: Coalition structure; core-extension; non-emptiness; dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-03, Revised 2002-06-26
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 8 ; figures: none
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0110/0110001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (2002)
Journal Article: The coalition structure core is accessible (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0110001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().