Three Union Regulations for Environment Protection Agency: A Game with 12 bank notes

Joseph Mullat
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Joseph Mullat: assoc. Prof., Economic Division, Tallinn Technical University, 1979 – 1980

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: It is now almost a common truth that society needs to avoid environment contamination or damage become significant for nature protection programs of the government and wild life preservation efforts. A possible outcome of such efforts might occasionally be a voluntary solution, which results that some industries are keyed up to find a break not to participate in environment protection. In the following we blow things out of all proportions, but the reader may found it informative to trace the interaction of interests between companies and environment protection agency, which takes into account the nature/content of industry activities. Contrary to the efficiency of a voluntary solution, what our solution is not, we still hope that we are at right advancing in the direction of self governing decision-making process.

Keywords: Game; Agency; Union; Moderator; Company (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-21, Revised 2005-08-27
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0112006

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