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The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps
László Á. Kóczy Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). We show that for the class of games with nonempty cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an indirect dominance relation between them.
Keywords: dynamic cooperative game; indirect dominance; core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
Date: 2002-02-04, Revised 2002-03-22
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 8 ; figures: 1 - included. Work in progress, comments welcome!
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Downloads: (external link) http://126.96.36.199/eps/game/papers/0202/0202001.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works: Working Paper: The Core can be accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps (2002) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0202001
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