A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons

László Á. Kóczy ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assump-tions.

Keywords: core; partition function; externalities; behavioural assumptions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2002-03-15
Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 6 ; figures: 1, included

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (2008)
Working Paper: A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (2002)
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