The Weak Sequential Core for Two-period Economies

Predtetchinski A., P. Jean-Jacques Herings () and Perea A.
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Predtetchinski A.: Universiteit Maastricht
Perea A.: Universiteit Maastricht

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Abstract: We adapt the core concept to deal with economies in which trade in assets takes place at period 1, uncertainty about asset payoffs is released at period 2, and agents trade in commodities afterwards. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that are stable against coalitional deviations ex ante, and moreover cannot be improved upon by any coalition once the uncertainty is being released. We restrict ourselves to credible deviations, i.e. coalitional deviations at period 1 that cannot be counterblocked by some subcoalition at period 2. We study the relationship of the resulting core concept with other sequential core concepts, give sufficient conditions under which the weak sequential core is non-empty, but show that it is possible to give reasonable examples where it is empty.

Keywords: Core; assets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 D52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-25
Note: Type of Document - pdf.format; pages: 30 ; figures: included

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http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0203/0203008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0203008

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