Modeling Electricity Auctions

David Harbord (), Natalia Fabra () and Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The recent debates over discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere have revealed an incomplete understanding of the limitations of some popular auction models when applied to real-world electricity markets. This has led certain regulatory authorities to prefer discriminatory auctions on the basis of reasoning from models which are not directly applicable to any existing electricity market. Vickrey auctions, although often recommended by economists, have also been ignored in these debates. This article describes the approach which we believe should be taken to analyzing these issues.

Keywords: electricity markets; auctions; Vickrey auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C43 C44 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-mic and nep-reg
Date: 2002-06-12
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on PC-MS WORD; pages: 9
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Journal Article: Modeling Electricity Auctions (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0206001

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