Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-point Methods

Federico Echenique () and Jorge Oviedo
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Jorge Oviedo: Universidad de San Luis

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings.

Keywords: matching; supermodular games; tarski's fixed-point theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2003-02-13
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on Linux PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 30
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0302/0302001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Core Many-To-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods (2002)
Journal Article: Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0302001

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