Continuous Fictitious Play via Projective Geometry

Ulrich Berger ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Using insights from the theory of projective geometry one can prove convergence of continuous fictitious play in a certain class of games. As a corollary, we obtain a kind of equilibrium selection result, whereby continuous fictitious play converges to a particular equilibrium contained in a continuum of equivalent equilibria for symmetric 4x4 zero-sum games.

Keywords: Continuous Fictitious Play; Best Response Dynamics; Learning; Projective Geometry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: Written
Note: Type of Document - pdf file; pages: 15; figures: included
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303004

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